After our Fall Break and some slight technical difficulties, we return to our readings in Environmental Ethics. This week we begin Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction and selected writings from The Ecology of Wisdom: Writings by Arne Naess (Ecology of Wisdom).
Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction by Robin Attfield, begins by explaining the origins of the environmental ethics branch of philosophy. He describes how we realized the need to examine our ethical relationship with nature. Attfield explains that throughout most of human history, prominent thinkers of the West, such as Plato and Aristotle, thought nature was "permanent and fundamentally unchanging." (p.3) "It was not until the 19th century that people like George Perkins Marsh, in Man and Nature (1864), came to regard nature as significantly vulnerable to human activity, and at the same time human life as vulnerable to nature and its changes." (p.3) However, we must pause here to add that many non-Western and Indigenous peoples around the world seemed to be more attuned to the symbiotic relationship between humans and the rest of nature, as attested to by their hunting and farming practices. Perhaps we should have tried to learn from their traditions. But, we digress.
Attfield lays out the timeline from the "rise of ecological science" in the early 20th century, followed by "the case for preserving [natural] systems" made by Aldo Leopold in A Sand County Almanac in 1949, followed by "Rachel Carson's work Silent Spring (1962)" which served to ignite the public environmental movement. (p.3) He explains:
The stage was now set for the emergence in the early 1970s of environmental philosophy and ethics, and related attempts to apply philosophy to environmental concepts and problems...At a World Congress of Philosophy held in Bulgaria in 1973, Richard Routley (later Sylvan), an Australian philosopher, gave an address entitled 'Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?'...[And,] in the same year as Routley's World Congress address, the philosophical journal Inquiry published another ground-breaking paper, this one by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary...' Another striking foundational contribution to environmental ethics was Holmes Rolston III's early essay 'Is There an Ecological Ethic?' (1975). (p.4,7,9)
From these early works, several important themes and issues kept arising. One issue was the "question of the scope of moral standing." (p.10) In other words, which beings matter within ethics and should therefore be considered when making decisions. "A further issue concerns whether, and how much, future interests count." (p.11) Another issue concerns what has intrinsic value, or value as an end in itself, and what has value simply as a means to some other end. And, lastly, there is "the question of the grounds for preserving species and ecosystems." (p.12) All of these issues are heavily debated within the philosophical community and, depending on where one lands on these issues, can affect one's stance on environmental issues.
Next, in chapter two, Attfield sets out to define some key concepts within environmental ethics. One key concept is nature. He explains: "I begin with the concept of nature, ways in which people seek to relate nature to human behavior, and attitudes both to the nature that surrounds us and to our inner nature too." (p.13) When discussing some of the ways that "people seek to relate nature to human behavior," he presents the philosophical questions that often surround this concept, such as:
Are human beings apart from nature or simply part of nature?...[If part of nature, does that make] whatever we do natural?...[I]f human beings are distinct from nature, it seems to follow that we cannot have evolved from natural creatures, and that they are not our kin (contrary to Darwinism). It may even seem to follow that nature is an enemy to be overcome. It even seems to follow that we do not have a nature, and may be moulded, with no harm done, into whatever way of life the authorities may prefer (as totalitarians sometimes claim). (p.13)
To combat some of the "unwelcome apparent implications," Attfield states that we must be clear about which "sense of 'nature' or 'natural' we are using." (p.15) For example, do we mean 'natural' as compared to supernatural? Or, are we using 'natural' as contrasted with artificial? Or, are we speaking of our human 'nature', as in "our make-up or what it is that makes us what we are, and what is natural consists in the characteristics that this involves?" (p.14) Or, are we speaking of 'nature' as the wilderness and its wildlife? He concludes: "As long as the sense in which 'nature' is being used is clear, then relevant problems can begin to be understood and addressed." (p.15)
Another key concept is the environment. The author explains that, though there are several understandings of "what is meant by 'environment'." Attfield states: "The concept of 'environment' has...come to be applied to the objective system or systems of nature, such as mountains, valleys, islands, oceans, and continents, and the natural cycles and processes that shape and reshape them...[And,] this is the sense of 'environment' used in this book, except where contrary indications are given." (p.19) He chooses to use this sense of the concept because it allows for the discussion of global environmental issues.
The next key concept Attfield addresses is moral standing, or moral consideration. He writes: "[Kenneth] Goodpaster's own answer [was] that moral standing belongs to whatever has a good of its own and can be benefited..." (p.20) "In other words, all living organisms have moral standing. Stances of this kind have been called 'biocentric,' in emphatic contrast to the 'anthropocentric approach of some traditional views." (p.11) "So moral standing can be held to belong to something whose rights are in doubt, or at least not universally agreed. The notion of rights turns out to be narrower and more demanding than that of moral considerability." (p.20) However, Goodpaster also explains that moral considerability is distinct from moral significance. "The moral significance of a creature concerns its moral weight, and thus the degree of consideration that it deserves, relative to others...So recognizing the moral considerability of a creature does not oblige us to prioritize it." (p.22)
The last key concept that is discussed is value. Attfield states:
Things are valuable when there are reasons to promote, preserve, protect, or respect them. So discovering that something has value means we have reasons for positive attitudes and actions in its regard. And when we understand something's value and have such reasons, we can go beyond issues of moral standing to issues of deciding what policies we should adopt and what forms of action we should take. (p.24)
He reminds the reader of Rolston's distinction between instrumental value - "dependent on and deriving from the value of something other than itself" - and intrinsic value - "valuable because of [its] own nature." (p.25) Philosophers and others argue over what beings have intrinsic value. Some think that only sentient creatures have intrinsic value. However, Attfield points out that those who align with the biocentric stance recognize intrinsic value in all living creatures' well-being or flourishing. (p.27)
In Ecology of Wisdom, we begin with the Introduction to Naess's life, work, and personal philosophy - which he calls Ecosophy T. "Ecosophy is derived from the word ecology, 'the study of interrelationships,' and sophia, 'wisdom'; the 'T' stands for the name of his mountain home, Tvergastein. (p.vii)
Naess's ecosophy as a life philosophy and worldview is influenced by Gandhi's teachings on self-realization and nonviolence. It is also related to the Mahayana Buddhist distinction between the small ego-self and the expansive Self of Buddha nature. In the Mahayana teachings, one vows to work for the enlightenment of all beings. It is recognized that we are all interdependent. Naess is also influenced by many aspects of Spinoza's philosophy, including the Dutch philosopher's nonhierarchical view of all beings and his account of active and passive emotions. Active emotions such as love and compassion expand our sense of self and awareness, whereas passive emotions such as hatred and jealousy diminish us...Naess says that our sense of identification can, through care extend to include our ecological self. This is facilitated by our giving full attention to the things and beings in our surroundings. His ecosophy is [also] deeply influenced by the Norwegian love of the natural world as exemplified in the friluftsliv movement involving outdoor activities in free nature, which he has practiced his whole life. (p.35)
Arne Naess was a mountaineer and has climbed mountains all over the world. "He has for a long time seen himself as a wandering seeker of truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. Using classical Greek, he says that he is a zetetic, one who seeks truth and knowledge but does not claim it." (p.6) Naess was in Vienna in 1934-35, where "he took part in discussions of the Vienna Circle and climbed in the Alps." (p.9) Naess left before the Germans took control of Vienna, but he did not escape the Nazi occupation of Norway from 1940-45.
He was a Norwegian philosopher and college professor at the University of Oslo from 1939-69. "In scholarly circles, Naess is known for his work in logic, communication studies, empirical semantics, foundational studies of science, research on international conflict and peace studies (which included cross-cultural discussions of freedom and democracy, and his in-depth studies of major philosophers such as Spinoza, Gandhi, and Wittgenstein." (p.5) He encouraged his students, and everyone else, to find their own philosophies of life. Naess was also a major proponent of multiculturalism and an advocate for pluralism. "He has contributed to conservation biology, wildlands philanthropy, green economics, ecological design, restoration ecology, sustainable forestry, wildlife and fisheries management, green business and building design, and voluntary simplicity." (p.19) And, last but not least, he was responsible for bringing international awareness to, what he called, the long-range deep ecology movement.
Naess's Bucharest talk, and the seminal paper published from it, explained the differences between the shallow and the deep ecology movements in broad terms. He noted that the distinctive aspects of the deep ecology movement are its general platform principles that recognize the inherent value of ecological and cultural diversity and of all living beings. Supporters use these principles to shape national and local environmental policies and actions...The deep questioning of the long-range deep ecology movement examines our basic values and lifestyles and reflects on our fundamental relationships with nature and who we are...[Followers of the movement] realize we humans do not know how to manage the incredibly complex natural world, but must learn from the integrity and diversity that are there...The shallow ecology movement is anthropocentric, that is, it has a humans-first value system. The deep ecology movement principles specifically emphasize respect for the intrinsic worth of all beings (from microbes to elephants and humans) and treasure all forms of biological and cultural diversity. The shallow ecology movement is more evident in the policies of developed nations, where there is support for a mix of shallow policies with some lip service to deeper values such as biodiversity. (p.25,27)
