At Journey’s End - Environmental Ethics Independent Study Week 11

This week we finished Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Environmental Ethics) and read the last selection from The Ecology of Wisdom: Writings By Arne Naess (The Ecology of Wisdom). In chapter seven of Environmental Ethics, Robin Attfield discusses the role various religious beliefs play in the environmental ethics field. Attfield explains that “given that the cultures of approaching half of humanity are strongly influenced by one or other of…[the] three [mono]theistic faiths…a focus on theistic religions and the related tradition of stewardship is indispensable in an introduction to environmental ethics (however short).” (p.91) Furthermore, Attfield explains that an essay, written by Lynn White, was highly influential in “stimulat[ing] theologians to develop what is often called ‘ecotheology’, or a theology of nature and of humanity’s obligations towards the planet and its creatures.” (p.93) This was because White’s essay “argued that Christianity is essentially human-centered and committed to an arrogant and despotic attitude to the natural world, holding that it is God's will for humanity to exploit the Earth,” and many theologians disagreed with this analysis. (p.92) 

     He next discusses the religious concept of “stewardship’. Attfield explains that millions of religious people around the world “believe that humanity’s relation to nature is that of a steward or trustee, many of them holding that in this role they have ethical responsibilities and are answerable to God for discharging them.” (p.91-92) He provides examples from not only Christian conceptions of stewardship but also Jewish and Islamic conceptions. Though all three religions have scriptural interpretations that seem to advocate caring for God’s creation, it could be argued that, among these three monotheistic faiths, Islam has the most comprehensive view of stewardship that even includes considerations for future generations. Yet, “while some other religions have regarded nature as sacred, the three great monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) have authorized its study and its use to satisfy human needs.” (p.95)

     Attfield also discusses some of the criticisms of stewardship. One criticism is found in the association of stewardship with slavery because stewards used to supervise slaves. Another is how stewardship is often tied to the religious concept of ‘dominion’ can “...prevent respect for the natural world.” (p.96) Another criticism claims “...that stewardship is invariably anthropocentric.” (p.97) Yet another criticism lies in the “...suggest[ion] that it involves human interference with the entire surface of the planet to enhance the productivity of nature’s resources,” what has been called ‘managerialism’. (p.98) Stemming from these criticisms the argument has been made “...that stewards will be prone to reach out for technological solutions to environmental problems, such as geo-engineering.” (p.99)  And, lastly, there are the claims that “...it is liable to ignore social and international justice and concentrate instead on the management of time, talent, and treasure.” (p.99) 

     Attfield next presents several other religions’ views on the environment. Among these, a few examples stood out to me. Attfield writes:

…Daoism is more explicit in being environmentally benign. It rejects sharp distinctions between humanity and the rest of nature, and, according to Lao Tzu teaches the equality of all creatures…[T]he dao of Daoism diverges from that of Confucianism, all along encompassing the natural world and non-human perspectives, and implicitly fostering a broadening of the relationships of the virtuous person beyond relationships between human beings. This…opens up the possibility of an environmental ethic based on relation on a relational self… (p.101-102)

This is similar to the ‘self’ of Arne Naess’s ‘self-realization’, to understand ourselves as more than only skin-deep. Another religious concept that can be incorporated into an environmental ethic comes from Buddhism. Attfield writes: “[The] Buddhist teaching about dukkha and compassion enables Buddhists to develop their compassion so that it includes not only current suffering (whether human or non-human) but that of future beings and generations as well.” (p.103) Additionally, “...the Borana Oromo [of Ethiopia] deliberately leave drinkable water close to wells for wild animals to drink in the night, believing that drinking water is among their rights.” (p.103) This example of an inherent understanding of the basic rights of wild animals is quite endearing and can be learned from.

     In chapter eight, the last chapter of this text, Attfield discusses ‘the ethics of climate change’. However, since we have already read Climate Change: A Very Short Introduction this semester, and since most of Attfield’s climate science data has not been updated since 2018, I will choose to focus here on the ethical components and any new information he can add to the conversation. Knowing that the current climate crisis is anthropogenic and that we are headed toward average global temperatures of 2 degrees, or more, higher than pre-industrial levels which would be devastating for many human and non-human beings on our planet, Attfield writes:

[U]nless vigorous and concerted action is taken, there is a significant risk of human activity generating catastrophic climate change, catastrophic both for future generations, numerous species, and human victims of flooding and other extreme weather events in the present, including people who have made little or no contribution to causing climate change. There is thus a strong ethical case for vigorous and concerted action to mitigate climate change, and, given that some climate change is already irreversible, to adapt to its effects. (p.107)

And, though I consider climate skeptics to be unscientific and often disingenuous, Attfield does address their skepticism by promoting the Precautionary Principle that we discussed earlier in the semester. 

     Next, Attfield asks the question: “How should entitlements to emit greenhouse gases and responsibilities to pay for mitigation, adaptation, and compensation be allocated?” (p.110) However, though Attfield presents several proposed systems, such as ‘Contraction and Convergence’ and ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’, the most important thing to know is that none of the proposed systems have been accepted or implemented mostly due to the developed nations. Attfield writes:

In fact, the organizers of the United Nations Paris Climate Conference of December 2015 took the view that no centrally administered system of distribution of entitlements and burdens was likely to prove acceptable, and that it was therefore better for all participant nations to make pre-conference commitments of their own; thereby countries which might not otherwise participate could be induced to do so. But the aggregated commitments, even if fully implemented, turn out to be insufficient to satisfy the goal (also agreed at that conference) of 2 degrees, let alone that of 1.5 degrees (agreed as preferable), with an expected average temperature rise of towards 3 degrees being more likely. (p.113) 

Additionally, another major criticism of the 2015 Paris Agreement “is that no mention whatever was made in the agreement of compensation, despite the harms inflicted on less developed countries by the emissions of richer countries whose prosperity has been achieved through historical emissions, many of them emitted since it became recognized that greenhouse gases were disrupting the global climate.” (p.114) 

     Another important concept that Attfield discusses is the ‘carbon budget’. I have heard that phrase several times, but never fully understood that the carbon budget was based on a scientific discovery, and it was not just an agreed-upon number by the countries of the world. Attfield explains:

It turns out that if humanity is to have a 50 per cent chance of avoiding an average temperature rise of more than 2 degrees, its total of carbon emissions has to be limited to an all-time total of one trillion tons of carbon. For either a 75 per cent chance of 2 degrees or for a 50 per cent chance of achieving a 1.5 degree ceiling, the limit is some three-quarters of this figure, or 750  billion tons. These figures have become known as ‘humanities carbon budget’. But unfortunately, 55 per cent of the budget of one trillion tons had already been emitted by 2009, when these figures were published…, and the rest of the budget appeared likely to be emitted by a date early in 2044. (p.111)

Due to this need to lower carbon emissions, Attfield does discuss some means of reducing our carbon output, such as renewable energy and geoengineering, however, again I will defer to the more in-depth information on these subjects provided in Climate Change: A Very Short Introduction. 

     Attfield closes with a consideration of ‘climate change as a test-case for environmental ethics’. He writes: 

Although the founders of environmental ethics did not envisage th[is] kind of anthropogenic climate change…, climate change epitomizes themes they introduced…Action to rescue the environment from degradation and pollution (such as global warming) is required by ethical principles, moral virtues, and the promotion of the best available outcomes alike. Both sustainable development and ecological preservation depend on strong action, both individual and governmental, local and global, in matters of climate change. Despite their disagreements, Deep Ecology, ecofeminism, Social Ecology, the environmental justice movement, and Green parties can (and must) unite in support of such action. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic supporters of stewardship,...need to lend such action their support, as do adherents of secular understandings of stewardship, and the adherents of other religions seeking to preserve the Earth and its sacred places. For the future of the planet and all its species is at stake. (p.121)

    This week in The Ecology of Wisdom we read the essay: “Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement”. In this essay, Naess discusses Spinoza’s philosophy and how it relates to the deep ecology movement. He begins by explaining that he considers Spinoza a great philosopher because his “texts are constantly reinterpreted by philosophers, poets, scientists, and others.” (p.232) He adds that some of the “nineteenth century’s well-known influential interpretations …[include]...those of Goethe and Hegel.” (p.232) Naess also explains that Spinoza has been interpreted in a multitude of various ways and throughout different historical periods. He explains: “For me, the lesson is primarily that new interpretations will occur in the future and that my own interpretation will only be one of a long series – forgotten in due time.” (p.233) 

     When introducing the role of Spinoza’s philosophy in ecological movements, Naess writes: 

Many people who are engaged in the ecological crisis claim to have been inspired by Spinoza…[However,] Spinoza does not write about the beauty of wild nature. Perhaps he never talked about it…What he says about wild animals does not suggest that he had any wide or deep sense of identification with any of them. Nevertheless, his kind of philosophy of life, its structure, is such that he inspires many supporters of the deep ecology movement. (p.233)

Naess then goes on to lay out some of the fundamental aspects and terminology of Spinoza’s philosophy that make it so appealing. He states: “One of the most inspiring aspects of the Ethics is this: It outlines a total view – a set of ultimate premises in our thinking about ourselves and the greater reality we are a part of, and Spinoza applies it to concrete situations.” (p.234) Naess explains that, though there are several Spinozistic terms that “express the fundamental views that have motivated the environmental activism of some,” he will primarily focus on one, amor intellectualis Dei – ‘the understanding love of God’. (p.235) 

     Naess expounds: “The term amor intellectualis Dei…had for centuries been [a] theological term…[which]...Spinoza modified in his own particular direction.” (p.235) He adds that Spinoza studied several philosophers while writing the Ethics, one of those was St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas “distinguishes between (a) natural love (amor naturalis) exists between even inanimate objects, (b) sensitive or animal love (amor sensitivus animalis), and (c) intellectual, rational, or spiritual love (amor intellectualis, rationalis, spiritualis).” (p.235) It is important to note here that rational love was considered the highest form of love due to its voluntary nature. This, interestingly, corresponds to Aristotle’s three kinds of souls – nutritive soul (of even plants), sensitive souls (of all animals), and rational soul (of humans), of which I am certain Spinoza was also aware. Naess further explains that for both Aquinas and Spinoza, the love of God was the ‘highest goal’; however, they may have disagreed on their concept of God. Naess interprets Spinoza’s God (Deus or Dei) as “consistently immanent…and hold that amor intellectualis is directed toward ‘God, not as infinite’...My minimum thesis here is that at least for one hermeneutically justifiable interpretation, the understanding of God, as part of the third and highest way of cognition, is directed toward individual, finite beings.” (p.236)

     Naess continues by acknowledging that in order to understand his interpretation he must discuss further Spinoza’s God and its immanence. He explains that, though Spinoza mentions God many times throughout the Ethics, it was his conception of God that branded him an atheist. Spinoza describes God as “maximally perfect (perfectissimus).” (p.236) However, Naess states that “Spinoza was using the adjective perfect (perfectus) in an old way, in which it means ‘complete’ (from Latin per, ‘thoroughly,’ and facere, ‘to make or do’).” (p.236) For scholars of Spinoza, this completeness is all-encompassing – nothing lies outside of God for Spinoza. Naess writes:

[According to Spinoza,] God is the cause of everything…Nothing at all can be conceived except through God…(But Spinoza does not say anywhere that “He” is good, and there is nothing personal about “Him”!)...There is no place, as far as I can see, for a God that has completely different properties from those of the “in itself” family. (p.236)

     Along with this perfection, or completeness, Spinoza’s God is also interpreted as immanent. Immanent is defined as ‘permanently pervading and sustaining the universe’ in the dictionary. And, Naess explains that, throughout Spinoza’s work, “one expression has supported the concept of the immanent God: ‘God or Nature’ (Deus sive Natura).” Naess expounds:

The God of the Ethics may be identified essentially with Nature-as-creative (natura naturans) – the creative aspect of a supreme whole with two aspects, the creative and the created – natura naturata. The latter are the existing beings in their capacity of being there, temporarily. There is creativity but not a creator. The verb “to nature” (naturare) covers both aspects in its dynamic aspect…From God's essence follows his existence, but only existence as essence. “God's power is nothing except God's active essence (2P3Sch).” It's manifestations are the “modes,” the individual beings. (p.237)

Spinoza’s immanent God was not the God of the Old or New Testaments, and therefore, he was branded an atheist. Naess describes how theologians even considered him ‘diabolical’, “insofar as his constant eulogy of God masked his terrifying aberrations.” (p.237) Naess adds: “In accordance with the immanence theory, every actual existing being partakes in the infinite power of God. This power, the only power that exists, is distributed unequally among natural beings, humans being the most powerful.”(p.237) This is why love for other finite beings can be interpreted as ‘the understanding love of God’ (amor intellectualis Dei). 

     One can see how this conception of God or Nature could provide ‘a set of ultimate premises’ that may drive one to want to care for and protect the environment and other living beings. Spinoza’s thoughts on being in union with nature and others, as well as his thoughts on being active, can also provide an incentive for joining environmental activism groups. Naess writes of Spinoza: “He says explicitly that he strives to attain a stable mental state characterized by the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of nature. And he seeks to do this with others not alone: ‘to strive that many acquire it with me’.” (p.241) Naess continues: “Activeness…makes for joy according to Spinoza. It expresses the nature of the active being, the being as far as it is in itself (in se), and the more directly it expresses its unique nature, the greater the joy.” (p.242) Additionally, science seems to back Spinoza. Naess explains: “Nature, as conceived by many ecologists and expressed philosophically by James Lovelock and others, is not the passive, dead, value-neutral nature of mechanistic science, but is akin to the active, ‘naturing’ nature of Spinoza. It is all-inclusive, creative (as natura naturans), infinitely diverse, and alive in the broad sense of Spinozistic so-called panpsychism.” (p.244-245)

     Overall, as we come to the end of our harrowing journey, we are at least left with some inspiration, hope, and knowledge that may aid us in the trials to come. Though we have learned about much of the damage we've already caused and about many terrible possible outcomes of the current environmental crises, we have also learned new ways of thinking about our responsibilities and possible actions we could take to prevent the worst of those possible outcomes. I think that we have landed at a moment in history that demands that we not lose hope and continue the good fight because too much is at stake. We must do all we can for those who cannot, both human and non-human, until we can do no more. For my part, I hope to find a career in either environmental education or environmental policy after completing my master's degree. As far as my personal philosophy is concerned, I believe in Spinoza’s God and I take a more holistic approach to environmentalism – though I cannot say if I prefer the ecocentrism of Aldo Leopold or the deep ecology of Arne Naess because I find merit in both. I can say that I do not take an anthropocentric approach to environmental issues, though human suffering does matter.