SLOs

Our administrative overlords have required us to submit boilerplate about our learning outcomes. I think this course is aiming at these:

 PHIL 3340, Environmental Ethics SLOs

* Heighten students' awareness of the salient issues and challenges emerging from the ever-increasing (and increasingly-deleterious) impact of human activity on the natural world.

* Impress upon students the potentially-dire ecological implications of anthropogenic impacts for all of life (human and otherwise) in the near and distant future. 

* Encourage students to reflect urgently on what steps individuals, institutions, and societies must take if these impacts are to be reversed, neutralized, minimized, or mitigated. 

* Prepares environmental career specialists to delve more deeply into research and applied strategies for ameliorating catastrophic climate outcomes and ecological disruptions

* Prepare non-specialists to participate competently in  the democratic process, in the quest for effective amelioration at the level of public policy and personal conduct.

A note from the University of Montana's environmental philosophy graduate program

The U of M's program is seriously hands-on:

Do you have students thinking about graduate school in environmental philosophy? The University of Montana might just have the program for them.   We boast a four-decade history of teaching environmental philosophy, and our stunning campus in Missoula is the perfect backdrop for all things philosophy and environment. Plus, UM is academic home to some of the nation’s leading environmental scholars.

Grad students learn from our expert faculty, and whether they are aiming for a philosophy Ph.D., law school, or a career in an environmental field, they won’t spend all their time sitting in classrooms. They will be out in the world, exploring nearby tribal reservations and taking trips to the breathtaking Yellowstone National Park. Our students intern with local nonprofits and public interest organizations. Then they dive into civic engagement projects that bring about real change.

The University of Montana’s M.A. has "distinctive program status" in the western region, which means students from 15 western states can enroll at just 150% of in-state tuition.   Want to know more? Tell your students to mark their calendars for an information session on Zoom, happening at 6 p.m. MST Monday, Dec. 4, 2023. Register through this link or contact christopher.preston@umontana.edu.

Continuing Our Journey - Environmental Ethics Independent Study Week 10

      This week we read chapters five and six in Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction and another selected work from The Ecology of Wisdom. In chapter five of Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, Robin Attfield discusses the need for 'sustainability and preservation'. He begins by defining sustainability and describing its origins: “The sustainability of a practice or society means its capacity to be practised or maintained indefinitely, and the main point of the early advocacy of sustainable forms of society (on the part of Herman Daly and others) was the importance of recognizing limits to certain forms of growth, including ecological limits. These forms of growth included growth of production and of population.” (p.61) However, he reminds us that the sustainability of a practice does not necessarily make it good or morally right. 

Attfield then explores the issue of development alongside the need for sustainability. He states: “[G]iven the importance of development in the distinctive sense of moving away from poverty, hunger, disease, and kindred evils, and enhancing well-being, it was recognized in the Brundtland Report of the United Nations (UN) sponsored World Commission on Environment and Development (1987)...that sustainability needs to be blended with development in what the authors called ‘sustainable development’.” (p.62) This is especially vital for developing countries of the world, and will, unfortunately, take time and money to implement. Therefore, the Brundtland Report “favored the introduction of sustainable agriculture and fisheries, sustainable energy generation, and, importantly, the gradual stabilization of population levels…” (p.63) Attfield adds: “The goals of poverty reduction and species preservation need to be jointly honoured (an ethically defensible approach), and where possible pursued together (as in forms of ecotourism which provide livelihoods for people of a biodiverse area at the same time as promoting preservation).” (p.64) Though it took quite some time to achieve any substantial agreement on the international level, in 2015 the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the UN General Assembly was a great victory on this front. “These goals…embody all three of the dimensions of sustainable development, the environmental, economic, and social dimensions, together with their inter-linkages.” (p.66) Along with these vitally important SDGs, Attfield recommends “all parties bear in mind…the Precautionary Principle, which advocates action to prevent outcomes from which there is reason to expect serious or irreversible harms, even in advance of scientific consensus being reached.” (p.69)

And, I could not agree more with this recommendation. 

     Moving from the subject of sustainability to that of ecological preservation, Attfield acknowledges that some individuals are “more hesitant about goals to preserve biodiversity, even if they accept such environmental goals as the goals to limit carbon emissions and to replace energy generation from fossil fuels with electricity from renewable sources.” He states this as the reason to explore the global problem of biodiversity loss and its potential solutions more fully. He writes: 

The extent and scale of biodiversity loss should first be remarked. Losses to biological diversity (animals, plants, and other creatures) have become so vast that the rate of loss may already be exceeding the rate of diversification implicit in the evolutionary process itself. Of an estimated total of nine million species, something like a quarter are at risk of extinction over the coming three decades…Losses are particularly striking in vulnerable areas such as wetlands, estuaries, coral reefs, and rainforests, where species diversity is at its greatest. At the same time, deforestation is…affecting global climate, and thus multiplying global climate change for creatures of every species. (p.71)

     Attfield then focuses on some of the arguments for preserving biodiversity. He explains that “some thinkers take the view that the reason for preserving biodiversity is its aesthetic value for human beings…But these grounds at best justify localized preservation, and are prone to fluctuate with the waxing and waning of human tastes.” (p.72) Another argument, that Attfield finds far more impressive is “the argument that compares living nature to a genetic library, and the destruction of forests to burning a library of volumes that remain unread. This is in part an argument from the value of scientific study…[and] also an argument from the uses that widely result from the study of wild species.” (p.72) However, the argument I personally find most persuasive is the argument that “relates to the dependence of humanity on non-human nature.” I think this argument is most in line with the understanding of a broader self that Arne Naess espouses. Additionally, it is disheartening on several levels to learn that “warfare is among the biggest threats to natural systems.” (p.76) However, this is one thing that we, as humans, can control.  

     In chapter six, Attfield dives into the various social and political environmental movements. The first movement he discusses is the Deep Ecology movement. Attfield writes: 

Deep Ecology commendably stresses the long-term, global, and inter-species aspects of environmental concern…[Additionally,] this platform favours equality within and between species, upholds diversity both of life-forms and of cultures, rejects all forms of exploitation, and supports the broadest possible interpretation of the fight against pollution and resource depletion. Further, it fosters human societies in which multiple forms of work are respected and integrated. (p.77) 

As previously mentioned, “the value-theory of Deep Ecology is based on self-realization,” and an understanding of the self as going beyond the skin to include the environment on which we rely, and to which we relate. (p.78)

     Another environmental movement that Attfield discusses is ecofeminism. He explains:

Francoise D’Eaubonne devised the word ‘ecofeminism’ as long ago as 1974, for reflection and activism related to the intersection of feminism and environmental thought. In its early days, ecofeminism developed insights such as that of Simone de Beauvoir, who had earlier maintained that patriarchal (or male-dominated) systems treat women and nature alike as ‘other’. These insights were taken further by Karen Warren, who stressed the links connecting exploitative relations between men and women and exploitative relations between humanity and nature. These, she claims, are closely associated forms of oppression, and neither can be overcome without due attention being paid to the other. 

     And. though these concepts add a great deal to the understanding of relationships between humans and between humans and nature, Attfield concludes:

[T]here does not seem to be the strong systemic correlation between the exploitation of nature and of women that some ecofeminists claim. Nevertheless, ecofeminists, in diagnosing these kinds of exploitation, have come up with valuable correctives to much previous thinking, not least about the environment. They have, for example, criticized an excessive emphasis on dualisms, and the kind of thinking that regards pairs of apparent opposites as mutually exclusive and conflicting…Ecofeminists have also valuably foregrounded the role of emotions such as compassion, and decried excessive emphasis on reason, not least in ethics…[They have also] criticized instrumentalist and egoistic attitudes to everything other than the self, as detrimental to the kind of sensitive relations with the natural world necessary for its protection. (p.80-82)

     Attfield next discusses the Social Ecology movement. Started by Murray Bookchin, the Social Ecology movement regards ecological problems “as fundamentally social in nature.” (p.83) However, as with ecofeminism, though this movement may bring important issues to the fore, such as the ‘hierarchies of domination’ prevalent in human societies that could explain, in part, our need to dominate nature, this movement does not seem to promote biodiversity preservation. And, in this way, does not seem to understand the interconnectedness of nature. Attfield further points out: “The dangers [of this movement] emerge more clearly in the light of Bookchin’s suggestion that humanity should take charge of the progress of evolution through systematic genetic engineering…This suggestion amounts to advocacy of a domination over nature that is both dangerous and arrogant, just as it has been since Enlightenment thinkers first proposed it.” (p.83-84)

     Next Attfield presents the Environmental Justice Movement, “A movement that campaigns against discrimination against disadvantaged groups or communities, for example with regard to exposure to radioactivity and the siting of toxic and other waste ‘facilities’.” (p.84) This movement deals with the unfair distribution of pollution into underprivileged areas, both within countries and internationally, as when the Global North sends its polluting materials to the Global South. This process of unfair distribution of toxic materials has been termed ‘environmental racism’ by James Sterba. The Environmental Justice Movement works to ensure that those from underprivileged areas are given a say in decisions about where to place dump sites and other pollution issues. However, this movement tends to fail to emphasize future generations and non-human interests. 

     Lastly, Attfield discusses the Green movement. He writes:

Green political movements have prioritized various themes of the movements discussed in this chapter together with policies of sustainability, climate change mitigation, and adaptation, and of resistance to pollution and polluting processes…[T]hey characteristically support energy generation from renewable sources, and oppose the mining and extraction of fuel, particularly through new technological processes such as fracking, holding that coal, gas, and oil are best kept in the ground…[Most importantly] they are widely prone to oppose the assumption that economic growth is to be welcomed. (p.87)

However, some have questioned how “political environmentalism is compatible with liberal democracy.” As Attfield points out: 

Some forms of liberalism insist on market economies being untrammeled. But there are other forms, such as that of John Stuart Mill, which recognize limits to growth, and goals such as the preservation of wildlife and of related habitats (whether for the sake of our successors or of wildlife itself). These forms are less intransigent while remaining committed to liberal freedoms such as freedom of speech. In exercising the liberal right to vote, people are free to support this kind of liberalism, and in this way the tensions are capable of being overcome. (p.89)

     In The Ecology of Wisdom, our reading for this week was “The Basics of the Deep Ecology Movement.” Naess begins by explaining: “Supporters of the deep ecology movement refer approvingly to A diversity of philosophers, cultural traditions, and religious trends.” (p.105) Therefore, defining the movement's “essence or core,” or pinpointing the “definite general philosophy of deep ecology,” is not something Naess is prepared to do. However, he does state:

In order to facilitate discussion about the deep ecology movement among philosophers, it may be helpful to distinguish a common platform of deep ecology from the fundamental features of philosophies and religions from which that platform is derived, provided it is tentatively formulated as a set of norms and hypotheses (factual assumptions). The term platform is preferred to principle, because the latter may be misunderstood to refer to ultimate premises. Furthermore, the formulations of a platform should be short and concise (as synopsis), whereas the fundamental premises are Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or of other religious kinds, or they are philosophical with affinities to the basic views of Spinoza, Whitehead, Heidegger, or others. (p.105-106)

He explains that though the supporters of deep ecology may have extremely different views fundamentally, they can still agree on “sets of penultimate views as formulated as a kind of platform they have largely in common.” (p.106)

     Interestingly, Naess uses criticism of deep ecology from Robin Attfield to help explain why understanding the difference between a supporter's ultimate principles and the movement’s platform is vital to the validity of one’s criticism. “For example, in the introduction to Ethics of Environmental Concern, Robin Attfield says: ‘I do not accept, with the so-called “deep, long-range ecology movement,” the view that our principal loyalty should be focused not on fellow-humans or fellow creatures but on the biosphere as an organic whole.” (p.107) However, as Naess points out, this is not the ‘principle loyalty’ of every supporter of the deep ecology movement, nor does it express itself in the ‘eight-point proposal’ for the general platform of the movement. This amounts to Attfield criticizing the foundational beliefs (‘fundamental premises’) of a particular supporter of the deep ecology movement, not the movement itself. Naess provides an Apron diagram (link included) to help one further understand the premise-conclusion element of his argument. (p.107) His argument is that Attfield is attacking at level 1 and not level 2. He explains that this “discussion has four levels: (1) verbalized fundamental philosophical and religious views, (2) the deep ecology platform, (3) the more or less general consequences derived from the platform – guidelines for lifestyles and for policies of every kind, and (4) prescriptions related to concrete situations and dateable decisions made in them.” (p.106) And, understanding which level is being criticized, allows one to respond more appropriately. 

     After explaining the ‘levels of derivation’, Naess then presents his ‘eight-point proposal’ for the level 2 platform principles. They are as follows: 

1. The flourishing of human and non-human life on earth Has inherent value. The value of nonhuman life-forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.

2. Richness and diversity of life-forms are also values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on earth.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 

5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

6. In view of the foregoing points, policies must be changed. The changes in policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present and make possible and more joyful experience of the connectedness of all things. 

7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 

8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes. (p.111-112)

     Though Naess provides clarification for all of these points in this chapter, I would like to focus on just one as it is an oft-quoted criticism of this movement. Point four is often misrepresented as a call to reduce the current population by some nefarious means; however, this is not the case. In his first sentence of clarification on this point, Naess states: “The stabilization and reduction of the human population will take time.” (p.113) What we are discussing here are actions such as increasing access to education for girls and women around the world, increasing access to contraception worldwide, enshrining a woman’s right to choose around the world, and other such proven methods to stabilize and decrease populations. Naess does, however, emphasize: “But the longer we wait, the more drastic will be the measures needed.” (p.113) To me, this is not a threat, but a realization that as we continue to deplete resources and wreak havoc on the natural world, our choices will dwindle in tandem. 

     Naess closes by explaining that, aside from how to approach various criticisms, understanding these ‘levels of derivation’ and establishing the ‘eight-point principles’ for the movement’s platform can help supporters of the movement and others recognize where their differences lie. He calls attention to the fact that, if asked about their deep ecological beliefs, “supporters of the deep ecology movement state beliefs on which they base some or all of their ‘eight-point beliefs.’ These normally, but not always, have the character of ultimate beliefs, making out premises for their eight-point beliefs. That is, from their former beliefs, the eight-point beliefs follow as conclusions and are therefore accepted as premises.” (p.116) Additionally, disagreements between supporters tend to take place at the levels of three and four, in their normative conclusions and what particular actions or policies should be advocated. Therefore, understanding this information may make disagreements within the movement easier to resolve as well. 

Next week we will finish Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction and read another selection from The Ecology of Wisdom.

The Morality of Having Kids in a Burning, Drowning World

"…Your happy childhood is no guarantee of the same for your kid, especially if they will grow up on a planet that will be warmer by nearly three degrees Fahrenheit. But you can reflect on the contributions that your parents made to that happiness and seek to emulate them. You can feel reasonably confident that the secure attachments you formed and the gentle guidance you received in childhood will be passed on like family heirlooms.

An unhappy childhood provides a trickier data set..."

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/11/27/the-quickening-elizabeth-rush-book-review-the-parenthood-dilemma-gina-rushton

How Electricity Is Changing Around the World

Carbon-free electricity has never been more plentiful. Wind and solar power have taken off over the past two decades, faster than experts ever expected. But it hasn't yet been enough to halt the rise of coal- and gas-burning generation.

That's because global demand for electricity has grown even faster than clean energy, leaving fossil fuels to fill the gap.

The dynamic has pushed up carbon emissions from the power sector at a time when scientists say they need to be falling — and fast — to avoid dangerous levels of global warming...

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/11/20/climate/global-power-electricity-fossil-fuels-coal.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
How Electricity Is Changing Around the World

Notes on Going Home

We can't help ourselves. We are shaped by the landscapes we are born to as inescapably as any other earthly creature born to any other ecosystem…

—Margaret Renkl https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/opinion/home-the-south.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
Notes on Going Home

‘A Beautiful Place That Has a Dragon’: Where Hurricane Risk Meets Booming Growth

The hurricanes keep coming, and the people, too: The fastest-growing places along the Atlantic coast this century are also among the most hurricane-prone.

Between 2016 and 2022, the five hurricanes that hit the Carolinas cost the two states over $33 billion in damages in current dollars, displaced hundreds of thousands of people and led to the deaths of more than 90, government data shows.

There's every reason to expect more damage in coming years: A warming climate adds moisture to the air, unlocking the potential for wetter and more powerful storms. And rising sea levels make storm surges more damaging and coastal flooding more frequent…

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/11/19/upshot/carolina-hurricanes.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
'A Beautiful Place That Has a Dragon': Where Hurricane Risk Meets Booming Growth

Distraction

Yesterday, Nov. 18, 2023, the planet's temperature went past the 2.0 degree Celsius barrier for the first time. It's temporary—but it's a terrible reminder that we're now in the desperate end game for global warming. And yet no one noticed because—unavoidably—the world's attention is riveted on the horrors in Gaza...

—Bill McKibben
https://open.substack.com/pub/billmckibben/p/its-so-hot?r=35ogp&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post

“I’m a Climate Scientist. I’m Not Screaming Into the Void Anymore.”

"Two and a half years ago, when I was asked to help write the most authoritative report on climate change in the United States, I hesitated. Did we really need another warning of the dire consequences of climate change in this country? The answer, legally, was yes: Congress mandates that the National Climate Assessment be updated every four years or so. But after four previous assessments and six United Nations reports since 1990, I was skeptical that what we needed to address climate change was yet another report.

In the end, I said yes, but reluctantly. Frankly, I was sick of admonishing people about how bad things could get. Scientists have raised the alarm over and over again, and still the temperature rises. Extreme events like heat waves, floods and droughts are becoming more severe and frequent, exactly as we predicted they would. We were proved right. It didn't seem to matter.

Our report, which was released on Tuesday, contains more dire warnings. There are plenty of new reasons for despair. Thanks to recent scientific advances, we can now link climate change to specific extreme weather disasters, and we have a better understanding of how the feedback loops in the climate system can make warming even worse. We can also now more confidently forecast catastrophic outcomes if global emissions continue on their current trajectory. But to me, the most surprising new finding in the Fifth National Climate Assessment is this: There has been genuine progress, too…"

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/opinion/climate-change-report-us.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
I'm a Climate Scientist. I'm Not Screaming Into the Void Anymore.

Watch Out Dept of Energy, Here Come the TikTokers!

The campaign to convince the Department of Energy that it's time to stop feeding the president antiquated information, and to shut down the insane mushrooming expansion of Liquefied Natural Gas export facilities, is gathering all kinds of steam. This week has seen great work in Europe, where some of the gas is currently sold, and a letter from a growing chorus of Democratic Senators and Representatives telling Jennifer Granholm to put the kibosh on CP2 and pause any more approvals until an entirely new set of criteria are in place.

But the biggest push of all may be coming from a band of young TikTok and Instagram influencers, who have decided this is the next great fight—and since they lost the battle over the Willow oil complex in Alaska earlier this year, they're committed to making sure it doesn't happen again. "We set a ball on a tee with Willow and watched the White House choose to strike out," says Alex Haraus, one of whose TikToks you can see above. "This is their chance to connect when they swing."

Bill McKibben, continues

Continuing Our Journey - Environmental Ethics Independent Study Week 9

     This week we continued with Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, and our readings in The Ecology of Wisdom. In Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction we read chapters three and four. In chapter three, Attfield discusses our moral obligation to future generations. He writes, "...the belief that present people can significantly change the future originated as recently as the Enlightenment. So does the belief that our generation may be judged by posterity, that is, by our successors." (p.29) From the environmental perspective, perhaps Western thinkers could learn from the traditions of indigenous tribes. Attfield writes: “In many African traditions this link is taken for granted; land belongs not to individuals but to inter-generational collectives such as clans, and any head of clan depriving coming generations of benefits they might have expected to inherit can be deposed.” (p.30) To further clarify which future generations we may have obligations toward, Attfield explains, “relevant future generations include all those that can foreseeably be affected by current people’s actions.” (p.30)

     Atfield explains, that though there are several objections to the idea that we have a moral obligation toward future generations, “...the grounds forwarded for discounting fail to justify discounting blanketwise or in general. At best, they justify selective discounting, where specific reasons…can be shown to be distinctively relevant.” (p.35) Attfield concludes that more important than understanding future people's interests and preferences is understanding their needs as humans, such as reliable food and water, shelter, clothing, and a healthy environment. He writes: “Accepting the need of future people for a relatively unpolluted environment already tells us a good deal about what kind of provision we should make in their regard.” (p.36) Additionally, the needs of future generations must include the needs of non-human species to be a comprehensive view.

     Attfield next discusses some future-related policies that can be gleaned from this understanding of future generations’ needs. Attfield explains: “Taking into account all these future needs alongside current ones is not going to be easy. Nor do things get easier when we bear in mind the extent of unsatisfied human needs in the current world, and the importance of putting this right…[but]...harmful practices and neglect detrimental to human and non-human health, present and future, can be avoided, and better practices introduced.” (p.37-38) Some of these harmful practices include, but are not limited to carbon-based energy generation, disposal of toxic substances, and soil erosion and growth of deserts. To engage new generations, Attfield stresses the importance of environmental education programs for “all levels from students’ earliest years onwards.” (p.40) 

     In the last section of this chapter, Attfield discusses ways to provide representation for future generations in current decision-making bodies. He explains: 

Part of the answer consists in ensuring that future generations will inherit ongoing democratic institutions, committed to upholding social justice, human rights, and a positive quality of life, environmental quality included…Another part of the answer involves putting in place institutions with the role of the long-term planning of infrastructure and supplies of energy and fresh water…[Along with] measures…to conserve options for future generations, preserving not only the quality of the environment but also cultural facilities such as theaters, museums, and libraries. (p.41) 

When discussing possible ‘proxy representation’, several possibilities are presented. However, one resolution that Attfield does not discuss, is creating a council of well-educated teens that can inform organizational and governmental decisions on policies that will affect future generations. I think this is our best hope of keeping future generations’ interests central to the planning.

     In chapter 4, Attfield discusses the ‘principles for right action’. He writes: “An obstacle to making progress with moral principles is the widespread belief that issues of what ought or ought not to be done are all matters of opinion, and that they do not admit of knowledge…[However,] most people recognize that there is such a thing as knowing the difference between right and wrong, and that, as such, it must sometimes be possible for moral claims to be true or correct.” (p.44) Another issue that some have is “the vagueness of the word ‘ought’.” (p.45) Therefore, Attfield states that “‘morally ought’ will mean something like ‘ought in the interest of all the parties with moral standing that are affected’.” (p.45)

     Next Attfield discusses various ethical models. He begins with ‘contract theory’, often attributed to Thomas Hobbes, but which has many proponents in Western philosophy. Attfiled describes John Rawls’s version of this theory, in which “...principles and judgments are acceptable and fair which would be agreed by rational and self-interested individuals, knowledgeable about human life in general, but ignorant of their own life-prospects. In conditions of such uncertainty about our futures, Rawls argues, our only rational recourse is to vote for principles and policies that provide equal protection for everyone's rights, ensure fair opportunity to lead the lives we prefer, and promote Improvement in the welfare of the worst off (for we might be among them).” (p.46) However, Attfield points out that there are flaws with contract theory in the context of environmental ethics. One issue is that it “performs less well when future generations have to be considered.” (p.46) And, another issue with all contract theories is that because these contracts are between ‘rational and self-interested individuals’, they do not “provid[e] fairly for non-human creatures.” (p.47)

     The next theory Attfield discusses is ‘virtue ethics’. Attfield explains that:

Aristotle…represented virtues (and vices) as stable dispositions resulting from sequences of choices, and as involving practical wisdom too. Accordingly, for Aristotle, the virtues are those traits of character essential for our becoming the best, most well-rounded and fully developed persons we can be, and resisting impulsive passions (fear, avarice, etc.) that undermine our capacity to conduct our lives wisely…There is much to be said for this approach. If we ask ourselves whether we are behaving as a courageous, kind, humble, and fair-minded person would, then our deeds are unlikely to be knowingly damaging, let alone disastrous. (p.48) 

However, as Attfield points out, this ethical theory falls short when dealing with “unintended consequences of actions…; and, Aristotle himself thought that we must “disregard the impacts of current actions on future generations, on pain of making ethics too complicated and difficult.” (p.49) Attfield concludes that it seems that even the virtue ethics require ‘justifiable moral rules’, and, he points out that Rolston argues that: “it is values (including the intrinsic value of nature) that give the virtues their point, and not vice versa.” (p.50)

     Another ethical theory that is presented is ‘deontology’ – the compliance with rules and duties – and is most famously attributed to Immanuel Kant. Concerns about this theory center around what should be done when two rules or duties seem to conflict and whether exceptions are allowed in any instance. Attfield, therefore, promotes the opposing view of ‘consequentialism’, which makes rightness dependent on “the different impacts or consequences made by actions, traits, or practices.” (p.54) Though the author admits that consequentialism can be criticized because of concerns over predictability, intentions, and justice, he still argues that consequentialism linked to “a broad theory of value” is the best approach when considering the needs of future generations. 

     However, I would point out that the problem of predictability should not be glossed over so quickly because it is a problem that humans are historically bad at contending with. We are not good at accurately predicting the long-term consequences of our actions, which has led, and can lead, to our ‘solutions’ creating bigger problems than we had before. This is the (very valid) argument against quick fixes, such as many geoengineering proposals to combat climate change. 

     Lastly, Attfield presents several ‘theories of value’. These include anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, as discussed in chapter two. After recapping these theories of value, Attfield argues that a biocentric value theory linked to consequentialism would be the best approach to environmental concerns that can affect the future. However, the biocentric ethic that Attfield promotes stresses that “some species have greater interest than others” and, therefore, would require greater consideration when thinking about the future. (p.59) I disagree that this approach would be best when dealing with environmental issues. Wanting to place greater emphasis on certain species' interests comes from a lack of knowledge about the interconnectedness of everything in nature. I do not mean this in some sentimental way, but in a very real and scientific way. Though we have separated our study of nature into many various specializations, any scientist who goes into the field knows that whatever his focus is it is dependent for survival on many other parts of nature. Therefore, if we choose to place greater interest on certain species to the detriment of others, the very species we are hoping to save could still perish because we have allowed for the disappearance of something foundational to its survival. For example, contrary to what the author writes, we should not prioritize “the greater interest of primates such as orangutans than those of insects” because without insects there are no orangutans. (p.59) We must learn to take a more holistic approach, while also acknowledging the limits of our own understanding. 

     In The Ecology of Wisdom, we read “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World”. In this work, Naess describes the process of self-actualization as he sees it. He explains that a major element of this process is developing our ecological consciousness. While discussing the self, he states: “The ecological self of a person is that with which this person identifies…[This] key sentence…about the self shifts the burden of clarification from the term self to that of identification, or rather, the process of identification.” (p.83) He explains that a sense of empathy is the most direct path to identification. Naess writes:

We need environmental ethics, but when people feel that they unselfishly give up, or even sacrifice, their own self-interest to show love for nature, this is probably, in the long run, a treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification, they may come to see that their own interests are served by conservation, through genuine self-love, the love of a widened and deepened self…

It should not surprise us that [Eric] Fromm, influenced as he is by Spinoza and William James, makes use of that bridge. “What is considered self-interest?” Fromm asks. His answer: 

There are two fundamentally different approaches to this problem. One is the objectivistic approach most clearly formulated by Spinoza. To him self-interest or the interest “to seek one's profit” is identical with virtue. 

“The more,” he says, “each person strives and is able to seek his profit, that is to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit he is impotent.” According to this view, the interest of humans is to preserve their existence, which is the same as realizing their inherent potentialities. This concept of self-interest is objectivistic inasmuch as “interest” is not conceived in terms of the subjective feeling of what one's interest is but in terms of what the nature of a human is, “objectively.” (p.86)

This is a true understanding of the interconnectedness of nature, to understand that in caring for and preserving ‘the other’, one is helping one’s self. 

      Naess explains that one of the practical implications of understanding “this concept of a wide and deep ecological self,” as opposed to the normal ego-driven understanding of the self, is that when we are fighting for ecological causes, “we are [now] engaged in self-defense.” (p.88) There is no need to prioritize my interest over that of another species because I can now understand they are the same interests. Naess expounds on this idea by stating:

The Latin term ego has as its opposite the alter. Altruism implies that ego sacrifices its interest in favor of the other, the alter. The motivation is primarily that of duty: It is said that we ought to love others as strongly as we love ourselves…Unfortunately, humankind is very limited in what it can love from mere duty or, more generally, from moral exhortation…It seems to me that in the future, more emphasis has to be given to the conditions under which we most naturally widen and deepen our self. With a sufficiently wide and deep self, ego and alter as opposites are eliminated stage by stage. The distinction is in a way transcended. (p.92)

     For those to whom this language seems a bit too sentimental, Naess writes: “Academically speaking, what I suggest is the supremacy of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics as a means of invigorating the environmental movement in the years to come. If reality is experienced by the ecological self, our behavior naturally and beautifully follows norms of strict environmental ethics.” (p.93) He describes this natural behavior as an example of what Kant called a beautiful act – “do[ing] what morals say is right because of positive inclination.” (p.93)

     Naess closes by explaining:

The most important feature of self-realization…is its dependence upon a view of human capacities or, better, potentialities…An individual whose attitudes are such that I would say that he or she takes self-realization as the ultimate or fundamental goal has to have a [comprehensive] view of his or her nature and potentialities. The more they are realized, the more there is self-realization…The rich reality of the world is getting even richer through our specific human endowments; we are the first kind of living beings we know of who have the potential to live in community with all other living beings. It is our hope that all those potentialities will be realized – if not in the near future, then at least in the somewhat more remote future. (p.95-96)

Next week we will continue with these two texts.