Continuing Our Journey - Environmental Ethics Independent Study Week 10

      This week we read chapters five and six in Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction and another selected work from The Ecology of Wisdom. In chapter five of Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, Robin Attfield discusses the need for 'sustainability and preservation'. He begins by defining sustainability and describing its origins: “The sustainability of a practice or society means its capacity to be practised or maintained indefinitely, and the main point of the early advocacy of sustainable forms of society (on the part of Herman Daly and others) was the importance of recognizing limits to certain forms of growth, including ecological limits. These forms of growth included growth of production and of population.” (p.61) However, he reminds us that the sustainability of a practice does not necessarily make it good or morally right. 

Attfield then explores the issue of development alongside the need for sustainability. He states: “[G]iven the importance of development in the distinctive sense of moving away from poverty, hunger, disease, and kindred evils, and enhancing well-being, it was recognized in the Brundtland Report of the United Nations (UN) sponsored World Commission on Environment and Development (1987)...that sustainability needs to be blended with development in what the authors called ‘sustainable development’.” (p.62) This is especially vital for developing countries of the world, and will, unfortunately, take time and money to implement. Therefore, the Brundtland Report “favored the introduction of sustainable agriculture and fisheries, sustainable energy generation, and, importantly, the gradual stabilization of population levels…” (p.63) Attfield adds: “The goals of poverty reduction and species preservation need to be jointly honoured (an ethically defensible approach), and where possible pursued together (as in forms of ecotourism which provide livelihoods for people of a biodiverse area at the same time as promoting preservation).” (p.64) Though it took quite some time to achieve any substantial agreement on the international level, in 2015 the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the UN General Assembly was a great victory on this front. “These goals…embody all three of the dimensions of sustainable development, the environmental, economic, and social dimensions, together with their inter-linkages.” (p.66) Along with these vitally important SDGs, Attfield recommends “all parties bear in mind…the Precautionary Principle, which advocates action to prevent outcomes from which there is reason to expect serious or irreversible harms, even in advance of scientific consensus being reached.” (p.69)

And, I could not agree more with this recommendation. 

     Moving from the subject of sustainability to that of ecological preservation, Attfield acknowledges that some individuals are “more hesitant about goals to preserve biodiversity, even if they accept such environmental goals as the goals to limit carbon emissions and to replace energy generation from fossil fuels with electricity from renewable sources.” He states this as the reason to explore the global problem of biodiversity loss and its potential solutions more fully. He writes: 

The extent and scale of biodiversity loss should first be remarked. Losses to biological diversity (animals, plants, and other creatures) have become so vast that the rate of loss may already be exceeding the rate of diversification implicit in the evolutionary process itself. Of an estimated total of nine million species, something like a quarter are at risk of extinction over the coming three decades…Losses are particularly striking in vulnerable areas such as wetlands, estuaries, coral reefs, and rainforests, where species diversity is at its greatest. At the same time, deforestation is…affecting global climate, and thus multiplying global climate change for creatures of every species. (p.71)

     Attfield then focuses on some of the arguments for preserving biodiversity. He explains that “some thinkers take the view that the reason for preserving biodiversity is its aesthetic value for human beings…But these grounds at best justify localized preservation, and are prone to fluctuate with the waxing and waning of human tastes.” (p.72) Another argument, that Attfield finds far more impressive is “the argument that compares living nature to a genetic library, and the destruction of forests to burning a library of volumes that remain unread. This is in part an argument from the value of scientific study…[and] also an argument from the uses that widely result from the study of wild species.” (p.72) However, the argument I personally find most persuasive is the argument that “relates to the dependence of humanity on non-human nature.” I think this argument is most in line with the understanding of a broader self that Arne Naess espouses. Additionally, it is disheartening on several levels to learn that “warfare is among the biggest threats to natural systems.” (p.76) However, this is one thing that we, as humans, can control.  

     In chapter six, Attfield dives into the various social and political environmental movements. The first movement he discusses is the Deep Ecology movement. Attfield writes: 

Deep Ecology commendably stresses the long-term, global, and inter-species aspects of environmental concern…[Additionally,] this platform favours equality within and between species, upholds diversity both of life-forms and of cultures, rejects all forms of exploitation, and supports the broadest possible interpretation of the fight against pollution and resource depletion. Further, it fosters human societies in which multiple forms of work are respected and integrated. (p.77) 

As previously mentioned, “the value-theory of Deep Ecology is based on self-realization,” and an understanding of the self as going beyond the skin to include the environment on which we rely, and to which we relate. (p.78)

     Another environmental movement that Attfield discusses is ecofeminism. He explains:

Francoise D’Eaubonne devised the word ‘ecofeminism’ as long ago as 1974, for reflection and activism related to the intersection of feminism and environmental thought. In its early days, ecofeminism developed insights such as that of Simone de Beauvoir, who had earlier maintained that patriarchal (or male-dominated) systems treat women and nature alike as ‘other’. These insights were taken further by Karen Warren, who stressed the links connecting exploitative relations between men and women and exploitative relations between humanity and nature. These, she claims, are closely associated forms of oppression, and neither can be overcome without due attention being paid to the other. 

     And. though these concepts add a great deal to the understanding of relationships between humans and between humans and nature, Attfield concludes:

[T]here does not seem to be the strong systemic correlation between the exploitation of nature and of women that some ecofeminists claim. Nevertheless, ecofeminists, in diagnosing these kinds of exploitation, have come up with valuable correctives to much previous thinking, not least about the environment. They have, for example, criticized an excessive emphasis on dualisms, and the kind of thinking that regards pairs of apparent opposites as mutually exclusive and conflicting…Ecofeminists have also valuably foregrounded the role of emotions such as compassion, and decried excessive emphasis on reason, not least in ethics…[They have also] criticized instrumentalist and egoistic attitudes to everything other than the self, as detrimental to the kind of sensitive relations with the natural world necessary for its protection. (p.80-82)

     Attfield next discusses the Social Ecology movement. Started by Murray Bookchin, the Social Ecology movement regards ecological problems “as fundamentally social in nature.” (p.83) However, as with ecofeminism, though this movement may bring important issues to the fore, such as the ‘hierarchies of domination’ prevalent in human societies that could explain, in part, our need to dominate nature, this movement does not seem to promote biodiversity preservation. And, in this way, does not seem to understand the interconnectedness of nature. Attfield further points out: “The dangers [of this movement] emerge more clearly in the light of Bookchin’s suggestion that humanity should take charge of the progress of evolution through systematic genetic engineering…This suggestion amounts to advocacy of a domination over nature that is both dangerous and arrogant, just as it has been since Enlightenment thinkers first proposed it.” (p.83-84)

     Next Attfield presents the Environmental Justice Movement, “A movement that campaigns against discrimination against disadvantaged groups or communities, for example with regard to exposure to radioactivity and the siting of toxic and other waste ‘facilities’.” (p.84) This movement deals with the unfair distribution of pollution into underprivileged areas, both within countries and internationally, as when the Global North sends its polluting materials to the Global South. This process of unfair distribution of toxic materials has been termed ‘environmental racism’ by James Sterba. The Environmental Justice Movement works to ensure that those from underprivileged areas are given a say in decisions about where to place dump sites and other pollution issues. However, this movement tends to fail to emphasize future generations and non-human interests. 

     Lastly, Attfield discusses the Green movement. He writes:

Green political movements have prioritized various themes of the movements discussed in this chapter together with policies of sustainability, climate change mitigation, and adaptation, and of resistance to pollution and polluting processes…[T]hey characteristically support energy generation from renewable sources, and oppose the mining and extraction of fuel, particularly through new technological processes such as fracking, holding that coal, gas, and oil are best kept in the ground…[Most importantly] they are widely prone to oppose the assumption that economic growth is to be welcomed. (p.87)

However, some have questioned how “political environmentalism is compatible with liberal democracy.” As Attfield points out: 

Some forms of liberalism insist on market economies being untrammeled. But there are other forms, such as that of John Stuart Mill, which recognize limits to growth, and goals such as the preservation of wildlife and of related habitats (whether for the sake of our successors or of wildlife itself). These forms are less intransigent while remaining committed to liberal freedoms such as freedom of speech. In exercising the liberal right to vote, people are free to support this kind of liberalism, and in this way the tensions are capable of being overcome. (p.89)

     In The Ecology of Wisdom, our reading for this week was “The Basics of the Deep Ecology Movement.” Naess begins by explaining: “Supporters of the deep ecology movement refer approvingly to A diversity of philosophers, cultural traditions, and religious trends.” (p.105) Therefore, defining the movement's “essence or core,” or pinpointing the “definite general philosophy of deep ecology,” is not something Naess is prepared to do. However, he does state:

In order to facilitate discussion about the deep ecology movement among philosophers, it may be helpful to distinguish a common platform of deep ecology from the fundamental features of philosophies and religions from which that platform is derived, provided it is tentatively formulated as a set of norms and hypotheses (factual assumptions). The term platform is preferred to principle, because the latter may be misunderstood to refer to ultimate premises. Furthermore, the formulations of a platform should be short and concise (as synopsis), whereas the fundamental premises are Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or of other religious kinds, or they are philosophical with affinities to the basic views of Spinoza, Whitehead, Heidegger, or others. (p.105-106)

He explains that though the supporters of deep ecology may have extremely different views fundamentally, they can still agree on “sets of penultimate views as formulated as a kind of platform they have largely in common.” (p.106)

     Interestingly, Naess uses criticism of deep ecology from Robin Attfield to help explain why understanding the difference between a supporter's ultimate principles and the movement’s platform is vital to the validity of one’s criticism. “For example, in the introduction to Ethics of Environmental Concern, Robin Attfield says: ‘I do not accept, with the so-called “deep, long-range ecology movement,” the view that our principal loyalty should be focused not on fellow-humans or fellow creatures but on the biosphere as an organic whole.” (p.107) However, as Naess points out, this is not the ‘principle loyalty’ of every supporter of the deep ecology movement, nor does it express itself in the ‘eight-point proposal’ for the general platform of the movement. This amounts to Attfield criticizing the foundational beliefs (‘fundamental premises’) of a particular supporter of the deep ecology movement, not the movement itself. Naess provides an Apron diagram (link included) to help one further understand the premise-conclusion element of his argument. (p.107) His argument is that Attfield is attacking at level 1 and not level 2. He explains that this “discussion has four levels: (1) verbalized fundamental philosophical and religious views, (2) the deep ecology platform, (3) the more or less general consequences derived from the platform – guidelines for lifestyles and for policies of every kind, and (4) prescriptions related to concrete situations and dateable decisions made in them.” (p.106) And, understanding which level is being criticized, allows one to respond more appropriately. 

     After explaining the ‘levels of derivation’, Naess then presents his ‘eight-point proposal’ for the level 2 platform principles. They are as follows: 

1. The flourishing of human and non-human life on earth Has inherent value. The value of nonhuman life-forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.

2. Richness and diversity of life-forms are also values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on earth.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 

5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

6. In view of the foregoing points, policies must be changed. The changes in policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present and make possible and more joyful experience of the connectedness of all things. 

7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 

8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes. (p.111-112)

     Though Naess provides clarification for all of these points in this chapter, I would like to focus on just one as it is an oft-quoted criticism of this movement. Point four is often misrepresented as a call to reduce the current population by some nefarious means; however, this is not the case. In his first sentence of clarification on this point, Naess states: “The stabilization and reduction of the human population will take time.” (p.113) What we are discussing here are actions such as increasing access to education for girls and women around the world, increasing access to contraception worldwide, enshrining a woman’s right to choose around the world, and other such proven methods to stabilize and decrease populations. Naess does, however, emphasize: “But the longer we wait, the more drastic will be the measures needed.” (p.113) To me, this is not a threat, but a realization that as we continue to deplete resources and wreak havoc on the natural world, our choices will dwindle in tandem. 

     Naess closes by explaining that, aside from how to approach various criticisms, understanding these ‘levels of derivation’ and establishing the ‘eight-point principles’ for the movement’s platform can help supporters of the movement and others recognize where their differences lie. He calls attention to the fact that, if asked about their deep ecological beliefs, “supporters of the deep ecology movement state beliefs on which they base some or all of their ‘eight-point beliefs.’ These normally, but not always, have the character of ultimate beliefs, making out premises for their eight-point beliefs. That is, from their former beliefs, the eight-point beliefs follow as conclusions and are therefore accepted as premises.” (p.116) Additionally, disagreements between supporters tend to take place at the levels of three and four, in their normative conclusions and what particular actions or policies should be advocated. Therefore, understanding this information may make disagreements within the movement easier to resolve as well. 

Next week we will finish Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction and read another selection from The Ecology of Wisdom.