Continuing Our Journey - Environmental Ethics Independent Study Week 9

     This week we continued with Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, and our readings in The Ecology of Wisdom. In Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction we read chapters three and four. In chapter three, Attfield discusses our moral obligation to future generations. He writes, "...the belief that present people can significantly change the future originated as recently as the Enlightenment. So does the belief that our generation may be judged by posterity, that is, by our successors." (p.29) From the environmental perspective, perhaps Western thinkers could learn from the traditions of indigenous tribes. Attfield writes: “In many African traditions this link is taken for granted; land belongs not to individuals but to inter-generational collectives such as clans, and any head of clan depriving coming generations of benefits they might have expected to inherit can be deposed.” (p.30) To further clarify which future generations we may have obligations toward, Attfield explains, “relevant future generations include all those that can foreseeably be affected by current people’s actions.” (p.30)

     Atfield explains, that though there are several objections to the idea that we have a moral obligation toward future generations, “...the grounds forwarded for discounting fail to justify discounting blanketwise or in general. At best, they justify selective discounting, where specific reasons…can be shown to be distinctively relevant.” (p.35) Attfield concludes that more important than understanding future people's interests and preferences is understanding their needs as humans, such as reliable food and water, shelter, clothing, and a healthy environment. He writes: “Accepting the need of future people for a relatively unpolluted environment already tells us a good deal about what kind of provision we should make in their regard.” (p.36) Additionally, the needs of future generations must include the needs of non-human species to be a comprehensive view.

     Attfield next discusses some future-related policies that can be gleaned from this understanding of future generations’ needs. Attfield explains: “Taking into account all these future needs alongside current ones is not going to be easy. Nor do things get easier when we bear in mind the extent of unsatisfied human needs in the current world, and the importance of putting this right…[but]...harmful practices and neglect detrimental to human and non-human health, present and future, can be avoided, and better practices introduced.” (p.37-38) Some of these harmful practices include, but are not limited to carbon-based energy generation, disposal of toxic substances, and soil erosion and growth of deserts. To engage new generations, Attfield stresses the importance of environmental education programs for “all levels from students’ earliest years onwards.” (p.40) 

     In the last section of this chapter, Attfield discusses ways to provide representation for future generations in current decision-making bodies. He explains: 

Part of the answer consists in ensuring that future generations will inherit ongoing democratic institutions, committed to upholding social justice, human rights, and a positive quality of life, environmental quality included…Another part of the answer involves putting in place institutions with the role of the long-term planning of infrastructure and supplies of energy and fresh water…[Along with] measures…to conserve options for future generations, preserving not only the quality of the environment but also cultural facilities such as theaters, museums, and libraries. (p.41) 

When discussing possible ‘proxy representation’, several possibilities are presented. However, one resolution that Attfield does not discuss, is creating a council of well-educated teens that can inform organizational and governmental decisions on policies that will affect future generations. I think this is our best hope of keeping future generations’ interests central to the planning.

     In chapter 4, Attfield discusses the ‘principles for right action’. He writes: “An obstacle to making progress with moral principles is the widespread belief that issues of what ought or ought not to be done are all matters of opinion, and that they do not admit of knowledge…[However,] most people recognize that there is such a thing as knowing the difference between right and wrong, and that, as such, it must sometimes be possible for moral claims to be true or correct.” (p.44) Another issue that some have is “the vagueness of the word ‘ought’.” (p.45) Therefore, Attfield states that “‘morally ought’ will mean something like ‘ought in the interest of all the parties with moral standing that are affected’.” (p.45)

     Next Attfield discusses various ethical models. He begins with ‘contract theory’, often attributed to Thomas Hobbes, but which has many proponents in Western philosophy. Attfiled describes John Rawls’s version of this theory, in which “...principles and judgments are acceptable and fair which would be agreed by rational and self-interested individuals, knowledgeable about human life in general, but ignorant of their own life-prospects. In conditions of such uncertainty about our futures, Rawls argues, our only rational recourse is to vote for principles and policies that provide equal protection for everyone's rights, ensure fair opportunity to lead the lives we prefer, and promote Improvement in the welfare of the worst off (for we might be among them).” (p.46) However, Attfield points out that there are flaws with contract theory in the context of environmental ethics. One issue is that it “performs less well when future generations have to be considered.” (p.46) And, another issue with all contract theories is that because these contracts are between ‘rational and self-interested individuals’, they do not “provid[e] fairly for non-human creatures.” (p.47)

     The next theory Attfield discusses is ‘virtue ethics’. Attfield explains that:

Aristotle…represented virtues (and vices) as stable dispositions resulting from sequences of choices, and as involving practical wisdom too. Accordingly, for Aristotle, the virtues are those traits of character essential for our becoming the best, most well-rounded and fully developed persons we can be, and resisting impulsive passions (fear, avarice, etc.) that undermine our capacity to conduct our lives wisely…There is much to be said for this approach. If we ask ourselves whether we are behaving as a courageous, kind, humble, and fair-minded person would, then our deeds are unlikely to be knowingly damaging, let alone disastrous. (p.48) 

However, as Attfield points out, this ethical theory falls short when dealing with “unintended consequences of actions…; and, Aristotle himself thought that we must “disregard the impacts of current actions on future generations, on pain of making ethics too complicated and difficult.” (p.49) Attfield concludes that it seems that even the virtue ethics require ‘justifiable moral rules’, and, he points out that Rolston argues that: “it is values (including the intrinsic value of nature) that give the virtues their point, and not vice versa.” (p.50)

     Another ethical theory that is presented is ‘deontology’ – the compliance with rules and duties – and is most famously attributed to Immanuel Kant. Concerns about this theory center around what should be done when two rules or duties seem to conflict and whether exceptions are allowed in any instance. Attfield, therefore, promotes the opposing view of ‘consequentialism’, which makes rightness dependent on “the different impacts or consequences made by actions, traits, or practices.” (p.54) Though the author admits that consequentialism can be criticized because of concerns over predictability, intentions, and justice, he still argues that consequentialism linked to “a broad theory of value” is the best approach when considering the needs of future generations. 

     However, I would point out that the problem of predictability should not be glossed over so quickly because it is a problem that humans are historically bad at contending with. We are not good at accurately predicting the long-term consequences of our actions, which has led, and can lead, to our ‘solutions’ creating bigger problems than we had before. This is the (very valid) argument against quick fixes, such as many geoengineering proposals to combat climate change. 

     Lastly, Attfield presents several ‘theories of value’. These include anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, as discussed in chapter two. After recapping these theories of value, Attfield argues that a biocentric value theory linked to consequentialism would be the best approach to environmental concerns that can affect the future. However, the biocentric ethic that Attfield promotes stresses that “some species have greater interest than others” and, therefore, would require greater consideration when thinking about the future. (p.59) I disagree that this approach would be best when dealing with environmental issues. Wanting to place greater emphasis on certain species' interests comes from a lack of knowledge about the interconnectedness of everything in nature. I do not mean this in some sentimental way, but in a very real and scientific way. Though we have separated our study of nature into many various specializations, any scientist who goes into the field knows that whatever his focus is it is dependent for survival on many other parts of nature. Therefore, if we choose to place greater interest on certain species to the detriment of others, the very species we are hoping to save could still perish because we have allowed for the disappearance of something foundational to its survival. For example, contrary to what the author writes, we should not prioritize “the greater interest of primates such as orangutans than those of insects” because without insects there are no orangutans. (p.59) We must learn to take a more holistic approach, while also acknowledging the limits of our own understanding. 

     In The Ecology of Wisdom, we read “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World”. In this work, Naess describes the process of self-actualization as he sees it. He explains that a major element of this process is developing our ecological consciousness. While discussing the self, he states: “The ecological self of a person is that with which this person identifies…[This] key sentence…about the self shifts the burden of clarification from the term self to that of identification, or rather, the process of identification.” (p.83) He explains that a sense of empathy is the most direct path to identification. Naess writes:

We need environmental ethics, but when people feel that they unselfishly give up, or even sacrifice, their own self-interest to show love for nature, this is probably, in the long run, a treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification, they may come to see that their own interests are served by conservation, through genuine self-love, the love of a widened and deepened self…

It should not surprise us that [Eric] Fromm, influenced as he is by Spinoza and William James, makes use of that bridge. “What is considered self-interest?” Fromm asks. His answer: 

There are two fundamentally different approaches to this problem. One is the objectivistic approach most clearly formulated by Spinoza. To him self-interest or the interest “to seek one's profit” is identical with virtue. 

“The more,” he says, “each person strives and is able to seek his profit, that is to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit he is impotent.” According to this view, the interest of humans is to preserve their existence, which is the same as realizing their inherent potentialities. This concept of self-interest is objectivistic inasmuch as “interest” is not conceived in terms of the subjective feeling of what one's interest is but in terms of what the nature of a human is, “objectively.” (p.86)

This is a true understanding of the interconnectedness of nature, to understand that in caring for and preserving ‘the other’, one is helping one’s self. 

      Naess explains that one of the practical implications of understanding “this concept of a wide and deep ecological self,” as opposed to the normal ego-driven understanding of the self, is that when we are fighting for ecological causes, “we are [now] engaged in self-defense.” (p.88) There is no need to prioritize my interest over that of another species because I can now understand they are the same interests. Naess expounds on this idea by stating:

The Latin term ego has as its opposite the alter. Altruism implies that ego sacrifices its interest in favor of the other, the alter. The motivation is primarily that of duty: It is said that we ought to love others as strongly as we love ourselves…Unfortunately, humankind is very limited in what it can love from mere duty or, more generally, from moral exhortation…It seems to me that in the future, more emphasis has to be given to the conditions under which we most naturally widen and deepen our self. With a sufficiently wide and deep self, ego and alter as opposites are eliminated stage by stage. The distinction is in a way transcended. (p.92)

     For those to whom this language seems a bit too sentimental, Naess writes: “Academically speaking, what I suggest is the supremacy of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics as a means of invigorating the environmental movement in the years to come. If reality is experienced by the ecological self, our behavior naturally and beautifully follows norms of strict environmental ethics.” (p.93) He describes this natural behavior as an example of what Kant called a beautiful act – “do[ing] what morals say is right because of positive inclination.” (p.93)

     Naess closes by explaining:

The most important feature of self-realization…is its dependence upon a view of human capacities or, better, potentialities…An individual whose attitudes are such that I would say that he or she takes self-realization as the ultimate or fundamental goal has to have a [comprehensive] view of his or her nature and potentialities. The more they are realized, the more there is self-realization…The rich reality of the world is getting even richer through our specific human endowments; we are the first kind of living beings we know of who have the potential to live in community with all other living beings. It is our hope that all those potentialities will be realized – if not in the near future, then at least in the somewhat more remote future. (p.95-96)

Next week we will continue with these two texts.